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“Under the most diverse conditions and disparate circumstances, we watch the development of 
the same phenomena – homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an 
unprecedented depth.” 
 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
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 1 
Preface 
 
When people ask me where my home is, I always have a difficult time answering the question. 
Paris? Lyon? New York? Madrid? Having been brought up between Europe and the United 
States, with a French parent on one side of the Atlantic, and an American parent on the other, 
multiple cities I have had homes in come to my mind. Between visits to my German and 
Albanian grandparents and Alsatian and Turkish great-grandparents, my life has been spent 
immersed in a landscape of different places, languages, cultures, and traditions - all of which 
have made me feel at home. Although I have always been aware of my somewhat eclectic 
upbringing and heritage, it was not until I found myself walking in a refugee camp in the West 
Bank, after my freshman year of college, that I fully understood what a formative role my 
upbringing and heritage have played in providing me with such a strong sense of grounding.  
The walls of the narrow and winding streets of the camp were covered in layers of fading 
graffiti that read ‘peace’ in multiple languages, and it felt as though I were eerily trapped in a 
labyrinth. I vividly remember the words of the young Palestinian man guiding our group, “This 
is where I live, but it doesn’t feel like home. I’m a refugee. I’ve lost my home and I don’t know 
when I’ll get it back.” I was baffled by the fact that a person could have such a dispossessed 
sense of home, and thereby be essentially ‘rootless’; for in contrast to my life, my sense of home 
had rarely been challenged. His words ignited within me a fascination with the complexities of 
conceptions of ‘home’ and ‘homelessness’, and their relationship with the phenomenon of 
displacement. This project was inspired by these questions and my recent visit to a Syrian 
refugee camp in Germany.  
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Introduction 
 
When Elliot Liebow interviewed Sarah for his book Tell Them Who I am, Sarah was homeless 
and living in a shelter. In one of their conversations, she told him that the hardest part about 
being homeless was not being able to decide what to do “because it doesn’t matter what you do. 
You’re not needed anywhere, not wanted anywhere, and not expected anywhere.” (Liebow 30). 
For Bernice, who was also homeless at the time, the most difficult part about being homeless was 
people treating her as if she “had a communicable disease.” (Liebow 217). Shirley, another 
homeless woman, told Liebow how challenging it was to feel like she had gone from being “a 
productive and respected citizen […] to dirt” (Liebow 217). Tell Them Who I Am goes beyond 
homelessness as the loss of home in the sense of a roof over one’s head and reveals its deep 
complexities: powerlessness “in law and fact” (Liebow 120); a loss of “connectedness to others” 
(Liebow 51); “feelings of loneliness” (Liebow 151); and being reduced to a “citizen of the street” 
(Liebow 116) that is not recognized as “fully human” (Liebow 21) by the rest of society. In other 
words, homelessness is a life devoid of a place to call home, but also of a spiritual home made up 
of ties to others, purpose, and dignity. This project is an effort to push past the prototypical ideas 
of homelessness and establish a more complex understanding of it. For this, I seek to determine 
the origins of homelessness. The intention behind a phenomenological approach is to study how 
homelessness appears and the way it is given in experience. 
In her book The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Toward Mankind, 
philosopher Simone Weil argues, “to be rooted is perhaps the most important and least 
recognized need of the human soul” (43). Yet, we live in a time when more and more people are 
rootless. Human beings, Weil argues, are rooted “by virtue of [their] real, active and natural 
participation in the life of a community” (43) - in other words, people strikes roots through their 
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natural membership and engagement in a community of other rooted people. This however, is 
compromised by the modern condition of “uprootedness” (Weil 41) resulting from the social, 
cultural and spiritual malaise that plagues the twentieth century. The danger of this condition is 
that it manifests itself through more than just geographical uprootedness, as it does also through 
spiritual uprootedness (Weil 45). When people become uprooted, they lose not only the physical 
attachments to their environment, but also their spiritual connections to others, to the past and to 
their places in the world at large.  
This idea that homelessness stems from a form of spiritual uprooting bridges Liebow’s 
anthropological and sociological approach to homelessness with Weil’s philosophical approach 
to it, and indicates that the phenomenon of homelessness is far more complex than the loss of a 
roof over one’s head, as it has a more profound existential dimension to it as well. Human beings 
need geographic ties to a physical dwelling, but also, and perhaps more importantly, we need 
spiritual ties to particular traditions, habits and practices that make up our sense of belonging.  
If homelessness is to have no place to call home - to be unwanted, to have a communicable 
disease, to lose a community - then homelessness is at the core of what the twentieth century 
political thinker Hannah Arendt calls “superfluousness” (475). For Arendt, superfluousness is 
tied to ‘isolation’, ‘loneliness’ and ‘uprootedness’. These are essential concepts for her because 
they set up a modern phenomenon which presents human beings in the modern age as being cut 
off from the traditional markers and authorities that give their lives meanings (such as religion, 
membership in a community, traditions etc). Having lost these experiences of being rooted, 
modern men are adrift in the world. When human beings are isolated - which is so say that they 
are powerless due to there being no one to act with (Arendt 474) - they become lonely. 
Loneliness is to feel abandoned and “deserted by all human companionship” (Arendt 474). 
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Combined, isolation and loneliness lead to uprootedness, which is the “loss of a place in the 
world recognized and guaranteed by others” (Arendt 475). The danger of this modern experience 
of uprootedness is its power to make human beings superfluous, “to not belong to the world at 
all.” (Arendt 475). 
What does Arendt mean by not belonging to the world? In The Human Condition she defines 
the world as, “the man-made home erected on earth and made of the material which earthly 
nature delivers into human hands, consists not of things that are consumed but of things that are 
used.” (134). As human beings we build homes for ourselves by using the materials provided to 
us by nature and earth. These ‘things’, which we build our place in the world with, are durable; 
they give our homes permanence and our lives meaning. When one does not belong to the world 
they are not “at home in the midst of things whose durability makes them fit for use and for 
erecting a world whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to life, this life would never be 
human.” (Arendt 135). Here, the durability of the materials we construct our homes with stands 
in opposition to the nature of human life, which is fleeting and impermanent. One basic quality 
of human being is our ability to artificially construct a human world. This freedom to make a 
world is evidence of human spontaneity - or what Arendt refers to as man’s capacity for 
“beginning” (Arendt Origins 479). To not belong to the world is to be deprived of a home that 
provides the conditions for a stable life, and refuge for our humanness. It is to be shorn from the 
human activity of creating the world in which we live. To be homeless is to be deprived of 
human freedom. That Arendt sets homelessness at the heart of her thinking makes manifest the 
deep connection between homelessness and the loss of human freedom that threatens our time. 
This project is first of all an effort to establish a phenomenology of homelessness in 
conversation with Hannah Arendt’s thinking in her work The Origins of Totalitarianism. In 
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parallel to this, it is also an exploration of what Arendt meant when she predicted that refugees 
would become “the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics” (227). The project is 
twofold, as it seeks to understand the phenomenon of homelessness by studying its origins, and 
then considers to what extent we can speak of homelessness in relation to refugees. I argue that 
the phenomenon of homelessness has three origins: rightlessness, spiritual disconnectedness, and 
political invisibility.  
In chapter one of this project I argue that homelessness originates from rightlessness. For this I 
turn to Arendt’s analysis of the stateless people. The uniqueness of Arendt’s account of 
statelessness is her insight that statelessness was tied to the breakdown of the European liberal 
and legalistic nation-state structure, which created a hierarchy of citizens based on nationality 
and race, and left people who were members of other national minorities rightless. This chapter 
begins by presenting the nation-state’s exclusion of minorities and refugees post Word War I as 
having paved the way for the exclusion in extremis of the stateless. Next, the chapter looks at the 
ways in which the nation-state not only denied the stateless the basic political status of being a 
person, but also produced people who had nowhere to go and were accepted nowhere. The 
chapter then moves onto what made statelessness an ‘unprecedented phenomenon’, namely, the 
stateless people’s loss of human rights.  
In chapter two of this project I argue that homelessness originates from spiritual 
disconnectedness. For this I turn to Arendt’s analysis of ‘the masses’. The masses were large 
numbers of unaffiliated and lonely citizens who, in moments of totalitarian governance, swung 
the political tide. Although they were not rightless like the stateless, they felt spiritually 
disconnectedness, or what Arendt calls “metaphysical rootlessness” (236). This chapter begins 
by looking at the collapse of the European class system after World War I - which until then had 
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provided people with a sense of belonging and purpose - as the context in which the masses’ 
spiritual disconnectedness emerged. With no class to define social status and to provide 
connections to others, individuals suffered an existential crisis and turned into large structureless, 
disinterested, apolitical, and lonely masses. Next, the chapter pinpoints the erosion of authority 
as the underlying cause of a general spiritual disconnectedness. In fact, the masses were not the 
only ones to feel lost in response to this break in tradition; other groups of people adrift and 
seeking meaning started to mushroom. The chapter then moves onto totalitarian movements 
appealing to the masses on the basis of what I call a ‘fictitious home’. Totalitarian movements 
were well aware of the overwhelming feeling of disconnectedness that permeated society and 
manipulated their propaganda so as to give the masses the illusion of a place in the world. 
In chapter three of this project I argue that homelessness originates from political invisibility. 
For this I turn to three groups Arendt writes about as being indicative of the dangers of living 
outside of the public world: the Jews, the Boers, and the tribal nations of Europe. The chapter 
begins by establishing the importance, for Arendt, of public life, and how appearing in public 
provides human being with a home in the world. The chapter then presents a case study of the 
Jews who never built homes that had a political reality, and instead, established roots only in the 
private sphere. Next, the chapter moves onto a case study of the tribal nations of Europe. These 
were the pan movements made up of people who did not obtain the sovereignty of a nation-state 
because they never developed roots beyond their common ethnic consciousness. With no 
political institutions or enduring cultural achievements that they could claim, pan movements 
proclaimed their innate superiority on mystical bases, which rejected other’s claim to human 
dignity and made it impossible to build a common world. The chapter then looks at the Boers 
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who led their lives completely divorced from the public sphere, by isolating themselves and 
never working to produce anything of their own making.  
Hannah Arendt predicted that the stateless - whose condition she believed to be identical to that 
of refugees (279) - in particular would become “the most symptomatic group in contemporary 
politics.” (277). Contemporary politics, Arendt argues, are marked by the discrepancy between 
human rights being inalienable and enjoyed only by citizens belonging to a state, and the 
situation of displaced people, who lose the protection of their rights (Arendt 279) because they 
have no legal rights as citizens. If contemporary politics are characterized by this human rights 
paradox that leaves those who do not belong to a political community homeless, then displaced 
people are indeed symptomatic of them. Devoid of a place to call home, shorn of rights, cut off 
from ties to others, and denied a political identity, displaced people become homeless; and the 
roughly fifty-nine point five million forcibly displaced people in the world today (UNHCR) are a 
clear indication of the overwhelming homelessness of our age.  
In chapter four of this project I argue that refugee camps are spatial manifestations of 
homelessness. Moreover, I argue that camps are a solution to the refugee problem that does not 
change refugees’ homeless condition; in fact, refugee camps leave it in limbo. The chapter 
begins by placing the emergence of refugee camps within the larger history of camps as modern 
spaces of confinement for bothersome populations who do not fit the framework of the law. Next 
the chapter moves onto the key characteristics of refugee camps and how these mirror the 
tripartite origins of homelessness. Refugee camps are spaces of exception that are geographically 
marginalized. Completely isolated, they are excluded from the normal order and deprived of 
public and private spaces. The chapter then looks at different architectural attempts at 
challenging the homelessness of refugee camps.  
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My reflections on homelessness were inspired primarily by my visit to one of Germany’s 
main refugee camps, the Lebach refugee camp in the region of Saar, in January 2016. As of 
today over two thousand four hundred refugees live in Lebach. The majority are Syrians fleeing 
the Assad regime and Daesh. Listening to the numerous Syrians I interviewed, I was struck by 
their absolute dispossession. To confront a Syrian refugee today is to confront homelessness and 
all its complexities. Since the Syrian civil war erupted five years ago, approximately nine million 
Syrians have fled their homes to seek refuge (UNHCR). Over four million have fled to 
neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and an estimated seven point 
six million remain displaced within Syria (UNHCR). The mass exodus of Syrians over the last 
few years has unleashed the worst crisis of forced displacement since World War II. Arendt’s 
claim that, “we watch the development of the same phenomena - homelessness on an 
unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth.” (Arendt viii) is increasingly 
vindicated as we witness human waves of Syrian refugees. 
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Chapter I 
 
The loss of rights: 
the homeless stateless people 
 
“The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion […] but that they no longer 
belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, 
but that no law exists for them […]” 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism  
 
In a letter to Hannah Arendt regarding The Origins of Totalitarianism, Karl Jaspers writes, “I’m 
more convinced than ever that this book, conclusively developed out of your clarity of visions, 
represents a major breakthrough for our political world” (Arendt et al. 273). Written on the heels 
of the war and with eminent scholarship, Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism has become a 
landmark in our understanding of the barbarity of the twentieth century. Although the book as a 
whole is renowned, one chapter in particular has received wide spread attention and become a 
reference across fields. This is chapter nine, “The Decline of the Nation State, and the End of the 
Rights of Man”.  
In this chapter of the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt produces “the most powerful set of 
reflections on statelessness” (Kerber 728) ever written. Through her analysis of statelessness, she 
observes that “ ‘the rights’ of man proved to be illusionary, when in the interwar period, 
European states were forced to deal with refugees who had been deprived of their citizenship en 
masse.” (Schaap 22). Arendt herself was stateless1 from 1933 when she fled Germany, to 1951 
when she became a US citizen. Her personal experience of statelessness deeply influenced her 
writing and propelled her not only to find answers to a pivotal time in history, but also to 
understand how totalitarianism had been able to render her and so many others rightless.  
                                                
1 Her affidavit of identity in lieu of passport reads, “I am a former citizen of Germany and at present 
stateless”.  
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The power of Arendt’s study of statelessness also lies in her unique insight that statelessness 
was tied to fundamental characteristics of the European nation-state system. A nation-state is a 
hybrid entity that claims territorial integrity as well as a specific national identity (Xenos 423). 
Arendt saw the rise of statelessness as coinciding with the collapse of this ambiguous nation-
state into a national state that created a hierarchy of citizens based on nationality and race. Such a 
hierarchy excluded members of other national minorities and eventually left them rightless. 
Against what Arendt takes to be the pluralist and legalistic foundations of political equality 
underlying a modern state, she argues that the breakdown of the state through the rise of the 
nation-state led to the latter’s “sovereign power to exclude” (Hayden 249) and therefore, to 
determine who had rights and who did not. This is why Arendt argues that statelessness was “the 
newest mass phenomenon in contemporary history, and the existence of an ever-growing new 
people comprised of stateless persons, the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics.” 
(Arendt 277). Statelessness came out of the nation-state’s exclusionist modus operandi. 
In this chapter I argue that homelessness originates from rightlessness. For this I turn to 
Arendt’s analysis of the stateless people. This chapter begins by presenting the nation-state’s 
exclusion of minorities and refugees post Word War I as having paved the way for the exclusion 
in extremis of the stateless. Next, the chapter looks at the ways in which the nation-state not only 
denied the stateless the basic political status of being a person, but also produced people who had 
nowhere to go and were accepted nowhere. The chapter then moves onto what made 
statelessness an ‘unprecedented phenomenon’, namely, the stateless people’s loss of human 
rights. Without legal rights as citizens of a state, the stateless no longer had the ability to create a 
home anywhere in the world.  
 
 11 
1. Historical context 
To understand statelessness one must begin by looking at the historical context in which it was 
born. Historical grounding is key in understanding statelessness, as Arendt argues that it 
epitomizes the twentieth century - “an era not only of world wars but also of nation-states in flux, 
newly forming, collapsing, and being reconfigured.” (Rürup 115). Arendt identifies the aftermath 
of World War I as the historical catalyst for statelessness; more specifically, the civil wars and 
revolutions that resulted from the crumbling of multinational states. Out of this chaos came 
massive migrations of groups comprised of minorities and refugees. These groups came to create 
a major citizenship and nationality problem, as they had lost their formal state affiliation (Rürup 
113) and were left wandering.  
To regulate this problem, the Peace Treaties established nation-states by grouping people into 
single states. The Treaties designated some as “ ‘state people’ ” (Arendt 270) that would be in 
charge of government. Others were “silently assumed” (Arendt 270) to be equal to the ‘state 
people’2, and finally, a third group of nationalities was defined as “ ‘the minorities’ ” (Arendt 
270). Arendt is critical of the Peace Treaties’ solution because the nation-state structure signaled 
a change in the state going from an instrument of the law, to an instrument of the nation (Arendt 
275). This is to say that the state as a provider of equality for every individual was replaced by 
the nation’s protection of those with the same national origin only. This method revealed itself to 
be inadequate, as it conflicted with Europe’s demographic map at the time, which was composed 
of minorities representing up to thirty percent of the inhabitants in some succession states (271). 
Consequently, minorities and refugees whose states were not conceded were marginalized. They 
                                                
2 Arendt gives the examples of the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and the Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia 
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transcended national boundaries, which left them outside of the modern national framework 
(Rürup 114) and made them anomalies. 
The Minority Treaties were created alongside the Peace Treaties as a response to the large 
numbers of people who did not fit the nation-state model because they were not “nationals” 
(Arendt 275). The Minority Treaties were created to safeguard the rights of these marginalized 
populations and make it illegal to oppress or kill them (Arendt 272), however, they quickly 
became problematic. The Treaties were met with contempt by minorities, as they further isolated 
them and reinforced the idea that “only nationals could be citizens” (Arendt 275). Because they 
did not share the dominant national origins, minorities could not benefit from the same 
protection of legal institutions. They saw the Minority Treaties as a form of discrimination 
reminding them that they “needed some law of exception until they were completely assimilated 
and divorced from their origin.” (Arendt 275).  
For Arendt, the Treaties’ true intentions were “a painless and human method of assimilation” 
(275), indicating that the protection of minorities was meant to be only temporary. The goal of 
the statesmen who were behind the Treaties, she argues, was to protect minorities until they were 
either assimilated or liquidated, which were seen as the only two ways to resolve the minority 
issue (272). These intentions were implicitly in line with the nation-state’s motives, namely, to 
eliminate diversity in favor of “homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil.” (Arendt 
270). 
Although the Minority Treaties marginalized minorities and treated them as exceptions, 
Arendt brings our attention to the fact that minorities were only “half stateless” (276), as they 
still belonged to a political body. The existence of such treaties meant that minorities had certain 
rights and protections, and were therefore still part of a legal framework. Statelessness per se was 
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born only when states decided that the Minority Treaties were impracticable and turned to 
denationalization to get rid of minorities, and washed their hands of refugees by ignoring the 
right of asylum.  
Arendt’s analysis of the Minority Treaties shows that what was arguably the first international 
attempt at guaranteeing human rights turned out to be a colossal failure (Parekh 14). The failure 
of the Minority Treaties reflected the international community’s incapacity to deal with the 
minority problem adequately. More importantly, it also revealed the nation-state’s increasing 
biopolitical power. By deciding that certain people belonged to the nation-state and others did 
not, and by treating the latter as outsiders, the nation-state developed the “sovereign power to 
exclude” (Hayden 249). The rise of the nation-state within the post World War I context marked 
the beginning of severe politics of exclusion.  
2. Politics of exclusion 
As Patrick Hayden observes in his analysis of statelessness, “The full implications of the 
sovereign power to exclude persons from political community became apparent when European 
governments began to denationalize large segments of the population (…)” (254). The “mass 
denationalizations” (Arendt 278) that removed specific people from organized political 
communities left large portions of populations with “no country on earth in which they enjoyed 
the right to residence.” (Arendt 276). For Arendt, denationalization was a profoundly “sinister” 
(280) measure because it was carried out in “in all innocence” (280), based on the “sacrosanct 
sovereign right to protect national interests” (Hayden 254). Denationalization explicitly reflected 
the nation-state’s implicit intolerance for different views, and the idea that whoever was different 
had to be kept out. Arendt provides an extensive list of countries that resorted to 
denationalization, such as Portugal with a decree in 1916 that automatically denaturalized 
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anyone born of a German father, or Italy where, starting in 1926, anyone could be 
denaturalized if they were seen as “not worthy of citizenship” (Arendt 279). The fact that 
denationalization became a common practice even in democratic states is strongly criticized by 
Arendt who is tempted to argue that the extent to which governments used denationalization is 
an indicator of “totalitarian infection” (278). Measures such as denationalization meant that the 
nation-state had the sovereignty to take certain people’s legal status away and alienate them.  
Also reflecting the sovereign power to exclude were states’ blatant disregard for the right of 
asylum, which had always been understood “as a symbol of the Right of Man” (Arendt 280) 
rooted in hospitality. The word ‘asylum’ comes from their word for inviolable (Bazelon 19), and 
since ancient times the right of asylum provided refuge, protection and sanctuary to exiles. Going 
back to the Greeks, the history of asylum allowed slaves who ran away from abusive masters and 
even some criminals to seek sanctuary in certain temples. Because the right of asylum entailed 
taking in people from other states, it profoundly conflicted with “the international rights of 
nation-states” (Arendt 280). Consequently, what had always been understood as an inviolable 
right eroded and was absent from all written law, constitutions and international agreements.  
Miriam Rürup’s analysis of the stateless offers two additional measures that reflected the 
nation-state’s politics of exclusion. The first pertained to women specifically. In international 
law until 1957, women’s nationality was “based on the principle of ‘derivative citizenship’ ” 
(Rürup 119). This meant that their nationality was dependent on their father or their husband’s 
nationality. States took advantage of this and many women who were married to foreign 
nationals saw their nationality automatically revoked (Rürup 119). The second measure pertained 
to children specifically. Due to “inconsistent laws concerning the nationality of children born to 
foreign or naturalized citizens.” (Rürup 120), even if a child’s parents were naturalized, 
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nationality laws did not always ensure that nationality was automatically passed to their 
children. If parents did not have valid papers, had lost their nationalities, or came from different 
countries, “children could be born into statelessness.” (Rürup 120). These two measures, 
alongside denationalization and disregard for the right of asylum, allowed states to wash their 
hands of the problematic minorities and refugees who did not fit the nation-state’s nationality 
laws. Deprived of a place in an organized political body, the people that were excluded became 
stateless.  
The stateless were “stubborn […] and much more far-reaching in consequence” (Arendt 276) 
than minorities because they became a nuisance to everyone, as opposed to minorities who were 
a nuisance only to the state they lived in. Because they belonged nowhere, the stateless were 
everybody and nobody’s problem at the same time - they “were received as scum of the earth 
everywhere” (Arendt 269). Refugees who were forced out of their countries, and either 
denationalized or denied the right of asylum, joined the stateless in legal status. Arendt makes 
the claim that “the core of statelessness […] is identical with refugee question” (279). Refugees 
had lost the protection of their home government and did not belong to the country they fled to. 
In this regard, both stateless people and refugees were deprived of the rights and protections 
afforded by citizenship (Hayden 256) and left outside the “pale of the law” (Arendt 277). 
The existence of people who belonged nowhere and were received nowhere was something that 
had never been observed before. For the first time, “the rules of the world” (Arendt 267) 
suddenly ceased to apply to masses of people. Arendt’s use of a semantic field of novelty when 
she writes about the stateless illustrates the unprecedented characteristic of statelessness: “whose 
sufferings were different from those of all others in the era between wars” (268), “a new element 
of disintegration” (269), “the newest mass phenomenon” (277), “new people” (277), “new and 
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unforeseen”(278) etc. Stuck in a state of limbo, with no government protection and absolutely 
no place to go, the stateless “were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere.” 
(Arendt 267). They differed from all previous migration groups not because they had lost their 
homes, “but [because of] the impossibility of finding a new one” (Arendt 293). The gravity of 
statelessness was not so much that the stateless lost a particular place, but rather that they “no 
longer belonged to a community whatsoever” (Arednt 295). 
The failure of the “only two ways to solve the problem” (Arendt 281) of statelessness, 
repatriation and naturalization, further emphasized the uniqueness of this condition namely, that 
the stateless were a mass phenomenon of people who belonged nowhere and had nowhere to go. 
Repatriation was unsuccessful because there was no place to repatriate the stateless to. The 
country of origin that had expelled the person who had become stateless did not accept them, and 
neither did any other state. With nowhere to return to, the stateless were essentially 
“undeportab[le]” (Arendt 283). However, this did not prevent states from trying to get rid of the 
unwanted stateless anyway. This task was handed over to the police who illegally expelled the 
stateless by smuggling them into neighboring countries. As for naturalization, it was 
“restrictively offered to a small number of individuals and persistently susceptible to revocation” 
(Hayden 255), which made it an inadequate solution when naturalization demands emerged en 
masse. Moreover, naturalization went against the nation-state’s legislation that recognized only 
those born in its territory or citizens by birth.  
Although statelessness was an unprecedented phenomenon, it certainly was not accidental. In 
fact, Arendt’s analysis of statelessness shows that the phenomenon has a clear history. Step by 
step, the formation of the nation-state, followed by the Minority Treaties, denationalization and 
the disregard of the right of asylum, produced statelessness. Moreover, it is important to note that 
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remedies to statelessness existed, but these were deliberately ignored and made ineffective by 
states in order to protect national interests. It is precisely for this reason that Arendt refutes the 
“material problem of overpopulation” (294) excuse for statelessness, and argues that the stateless 
peoples’ expulsion from the nation-state was strictly a “political organization” (294) problem. 
3. Loss of the Rights of Man  
The sovereign power to exclude had severe consequences on the doctrine of human rights. The 
change in the state’s function as a provider of equal rights for all, to a provider of equal rights for 
those who were nationals only meant that the stateless were essentially “rightless” (293). To 
understand the conflict between the condition of statelessness and human rights, it is helpful to 
turn to Arendt’s explanation of the paradox that came to light at the very birth of the modern 
nation-state. This is when “the French Revolution combined the declaration of the Rights of Man 
with the demand for national sovereignty.” (Arendt 230). These Rights of Man, which were “the 
inalienable heritage of all human beings” (Arendt 230), were also claimed to be the “specific 
heritage of specific nations” (Arendt 230). Human rights were therefore guaranteed only as 
national rights. More importantly, this meant that a nation was therefore subject to the laws of 
the Right of Man and sovereign - “Man himself was their source as well as their ultimate goal.” 
(Arendt 291). It is here that Arendt sees the fundamental “paradox” (291) of human rights.  
This paradox only became evident with the emergence of the stateless who, because they had 
been excluded from the polity and therefore lost their rights as citizens of a state, lost their 
human rights as well. With the Rights of Man being declared as inalienable and therefore 
independent of government, the humanity of the stateless revealed itself insufficient as a base for 
human rights. There was no authority to protect the stateless, as the state’s role was to “grant full 
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civil and political rights only to those who belonged to the national community by right of 
origin and fact of birth.” (Arendt 230).  
Arendt expresses the consequences of being rightless through an enumeration of losses. She 
begins with the loss of the home, which she understands as “the entire social texture” (293) into 
which the rightless were born and in which they established a distinct place in the world for 
themselves. In her essay We Refugees, Arendt lists the different elements that comprised this 
social texture that was also lost by refugees after World War II: the home, which she equates 
with “the familiarity of daily life” (110); an occupation, which she equates with “the confidence 
[of being] of some use in this world” (110); and finally, a language, which she equates with “the 
naturalness of reactions” (Arendt 110). Deprived of rights, the rightless lost the environment that 
they constructed with others and from which they derived roots.  
In addition to the loss of this social structure, the rightless lost their government’s protection as 
well as the protection of other governments. Once they had been “thrown out of one of these 
tightly organized closed communities [they] found [themselves] thrown out of the family of 
nations altogether.” (Arendt 294). The rightless were an “anomaly for whom the general law did 
not provide” (286). Incapable of providing laws for those who had lost all government 
protection, the nation-state handed the matter over to the police. As the number of stateless and 
refugees living in conditions of rightlessness grew, the more “unrestricted and arbitrary” (Arendt 
288) power the police gained. The amount of authority given to the police to handle the problem 
of statelessness marked the first time in Western Europe that the police acted on its own (Arendt 
287). In this regard, the police underwent a change similar to the one the state did, as it went 
from being “an instrument to carry out and enforce the law” of the state (Arendt 287) to an 
independent authority that ruled directly over certain people. 
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Beyond the right to a roof over one’s head, an occupation, a language and government 
protection, there is a right Arendt recognizes as having “a place in the world which makes 
opinions significant and actions effective.” (296). To have a place in the world is to be part of 
“the man-made home erected on earth and made of the material which earthly nature delivers 
into human hands, consists not of things that are consumed but of things that are used.” (Arendt 
134). As human beings we build homes for ourselves by using the materials provided to us by 
nature and earth. These ‘things’, which we build our place in the world with, are durable; they 
give our homes permanence and our lives meaning. When one does not belong to the world they 
are not “at home in the midst of things whose durability makes them fit for use and for erecting a 
world whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to life, this life would never be human.” 
(Arendt 135). Here, the durability of the materials we construct our homes with stands in 
opposition to the nature of human life, which is fleeting and impermanent. One basic quality of 
human being is our ability to artificially construct a human world. This freedom to make a world 
is evidence of human spontaneity - or what Arendt refers to as man’s capacity for “beginning” 
(Arendt Origins 479). To not belong to the world is to be deprived of a home that provides the 
conditions for a stable life, and refuge for our humanness. It is to be shorn from the human 
activity of creating the world in which we live.  
This is why Arendt believes that the most basic right of a human being should be “the right to 
have rights” (296) namely, the right to belong to a community that guarantees a person equal 
status independent of human plurality and regardless of citizenship and nationality. By losing 
their rights, the stateless had no way to find their way back into a world of fellowship and 
purpose (Arendt 189) and could no longer be at home anywhere in the world.  
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Chapter II 
 
Spiritual disconnectedness: 
the homeless mass man 
 
“The truth is that the masses grew out of the fragments of a highly atomized society whose 
competitive structure and concomitant loneliness of the individual had been held in check only 
through membership in a class. The chief characteristic of the mass man is not brutality and 
backwardness, but his isolation and lack of normal relationships.” 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
 
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of statelessness supports Liebow and Weil’s understanding of 
homelessness as more than the loss of a particular place to call home. At the core of statelessness 
is the loss of place in the world, as to be stateless is to be deprived of the right to be at home 
anywhere. Two crucial concepts of Arendt’s that relate to her thinking about statelessness are 
“uprootedness” (475) and “isolation” (474). Having lost their rights, the stateless were isolated 
from the world of human fellowship and therefore, uprooted, which is to have “no place in the 
world” (Arendt 475). One of the key elements of Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism is that 
totalitarian regimes could not exist without isolating people.   
Totalitarian regimes’ unique characteristic though is their dissatisfaction with men being 
simply isolated. Totalitarianism goes further by also “bas[ing] itself on loneliness, on the 
experience of not belonging to the world at all” (Arendt 475). To be lonely is to feel abandoned 
and “deserted by all human companionship” (Arendt 474). Loneliness is precisely what 
characterized ‘the masses’, the large numbers of unaffiliated and disconnected citizens who, in 
moments of totalitarian governance, swung the political tide. How do individuals become lonely 
masses? To answer this question Arendt looks at the masses as a phenomenon of catastrophic 
upheaval through war, revolution and economic collapse.  
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The fact that these are the same conditions in which statelessness emerged cannot be 
ignored. In the case of the stateless, war, revolution and economic collapse coincided with the 
consolidation of the nation-state, which, as we saw, led those who did not fit the nation-state’s 
nationality laws to be rightless. Contrary to the stateless, the masses who were not minorities or 
refugees, were at home within the nation-state. In the case of the masses, war, revolution and 
economic collapse coincided with the breakdown of the class system, which had provided people 
with a sense of belonging and fellowship. This breakdown left the masses feeling lost and 
spiritually disconnected. Whereas the stateless experienced homelessness as a form of isolation, 
the masses experienced it as a form of unbearable loneliness, or what Arendt calls “metaphysical 
rootlessness” (Arendt 236). 
In chapter two of this project I argue that homelessness originates from spiritual 
disconnectedness. For this I turn to Arendt’s analysis of ‘the masses’. This chapter begins by 
looking at the collapse of the European class system after World War I - which until then had 
provided people with a sense of belonging and purpose - as the context in which the masses’ 
spiritual disconnectedness emerged. With no class to define social status and to provide 
connections to others, individuals suffered an existential crisis and turned into large structureless, 
disinterested, apolitical, and lonely masses. Next, the chapter pinpoints the erosion of authority 
as the underlying cause of a general spiritual disconnectedness. In fact, the masses were not the 
only ones to feel lost in response to this break in tradition; other groups of people adrift and 
seeking meaning started to mushroom. The chapter then moves onto totalitarian movements 
appealing to the masses on the basis of what I call a ‘fictitious home’. Totalitarian movements 
were well aware of the overwhelming feeling of disconnectedness that permeated society and 
manipulated their propaganda so as to give the masses the illusion of a place in the world. 
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1. Collapse of the European class system and birth of the masses 
The collapse of the European class system during the nineteen twenties and thirties had a great 
impact on the development of the masses. In Germany for instance, Arendt quotes William 
Ebenstein who writes that the breakdown was, “ ‘one of the most dramatic events in recent 
German history’ ” (313). In his analysis of the masses, Peter Baehr argues that the masses 
emerged within two different contexts. The first was the turmoil that followed World War I, 
which was a time of revolution, military defeat, economic depressions, collapsing empires, and 
new ethnically based states resulting in the displacement of those deemed aliens (Baehr 12). The 
post war “calamity” (Baehr12) was too much for the class system to handle and ended up 
crushing it. What came out of this general chaos were large numbers of unemployed workers, 
dispossessed small businessmen and people who used to belong to the middle and upper classes. 
It is the lumping together of these groups who had lost their ties to others that came to form the 
masses. After World War II, the “same dramatic event of a breakdown of the class system 
repeated itself in almost all European countries.” (Arendt 313). Baehr gives the example of 
National Socialism in Germany and Austria, which “took advantage of this crisis [to organize] 
masses that had been politically disenfranchised and economically emasculated in the inter-war 
years.” (13) These masses of broken up individuals craving to be part of something again became 
the “basis” (Baehr 13) of the Nazi dictatorship, and later, of totalitarian rule.  
The second context was the artificially created breakdown of the class system by Stalin. Stalin 
came to power wanting to rule over masses of distraught people so that he could easily rally and 
manipulate them. In order to do so, he destroyed all the existing social stratifications that had 
been previously installed by Lenin. Stalin intentionally atomized people with policies aimed at 
“pulverizing all groups and factions that were independent of the state.” (Baehr 13) His first step 
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was to decimate all former communal institutions, which was then followed by the liquidation 
of the classes and of the bureaucracy that had helped with the previous liquidation measures 
(Arendt 321). Stalin’s fabrication of an atomized society “[prepared] the country for totalitarian 
government.” (Baehr 13) and transformed “the slumbering majorities behind all parties into one 
great, unorganized, structureless mass” (Arendt 315). In Europe, the rise of the masses was 
unintended, whereas it was carefully planned in Russia. In both cases however, it was social 
atomization that led large numbers of individuals to be cut off from others and lose a sense of 
belonging.  
To understand how the collapse of the class system left people adrift, it is helpful to look at the 
ways in which it had provided people with a sense of fellowship and purpose. Until its collapse, 
the class system had been a solid and consistent feature of society (Canovan 408). It acted as a 
stabilizing force by upholding a structure and order. Through “social membership” (Baehr 12), 
the class system gave individuals a specific place in society and therefore, an identity. Those 
who were part of the class system were “interest-bound” (Baehr 12), or as Arendt writes, “held 
together by a consciousness of common interest” (Arendt 311). Classes were formations of like-
minded people with a “class articulateness” (Arendt 311), which is to say that they had 
developed an awareness of themselves as a class, with a shared identity, collective history, group 
trajectory, and common objectives. The class system allowed people to be engaged and make 
decisions pertaining to the common interests of their class and therefore, to have a sense of 
purpose and meaning. Members of the class system were “citizens with opinions about, and 
interests in, the handling of public affairs” (Arendt 309). When the breakdown of the class 
system occurred, relationships between people with a common identity and place in the world 
were severed. What individuals had taken to be a rooted place in society no longer meant 
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anything, as everything people had built through a common social understanding with others 
fell apart.  
The spiritual disconnectedness of the masses emerged in this “atmosphere” (Arendt 315) of the 
breakdown of class society. Class members went from being individuals connected through a 
social structure, to “one great unorganized, structureless mass of furious individuals” (Arendt 
315). As the entire social structure fell apart, anxiety, anger and cynicism started to amount 
(McCarthy 44). Social calamity and mass unemployment touched “individuals of all social and 
intellectual persuasions” (Baehr 13). The majorities behind the no longer existing classes 
dissolved into a distressed and dissatisfied mass. The standards and attitudes of the masses never 
reflected those of the dominating class but instead, were a perversion of the standards and 
attitudes of all classes (Arendt 314). This meant that there was no cohesive system of ideas and 
ideals uniting the masses. The shared experience of despair and disconnectedness was the only 
thing that held the masses together. More importantly, it meant that a certain individualism had 
completed disappeared.  
This lack of individualism was characteristic of the masses’ self-abandonment, or what Arendt 
refers to as their ‘selflessness’, which was accompanied by “bitterness” (Arendt 315) and 
“indifference” (Arendt 316). Arendt provides a specific definition of selflessness within the 
context of the masses: “Selflessness in the sense that oneself does not matter, the feeling of being 
expendable” (315). With no class to be a part of and engage in, the masses felt as thought they 
had become useless. Their loss of purpose turned into a profound indifference. If there no longer 
was a social status or fellowship to be gained, then everything was incoherent and empty. The 
masses’ mentality was plagued by “bored indifference” (Arendt 316).  For Arendt, the 
indifference and loss of self-interest that characterized the masses was extremely “disturbing” 
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(307) for it indicated a complete lack of care for essentially everything: the masses showed 
indifference “in the fact of death”, a “passionate inclination toward the most abstract notions as 
guides for life”, and a “general contempt for even the most obvious rules of common sense.” 
(Arendt 316). The masses became representative of a complete loss of “integrity” (McCarthy 45) 
and faith. The world was no longer a place they could derive meaning from or be active creators 
of meaning in. This extreme passivity, lack of hope, common set of ideals and beliefs turned the 
masses into “robots” (Arendt 363) that disregarded not only others’ lives, but their own as well. 
The rise of the mass man Arendt writes, was something that had been predicted by European 
scholars and statesmen starting in the early nineteenth century but these predictions were 
somewhat discredited by the masses’ unimaginable radical loss of self-interest (Arendt 316). The 
masses, like the stateless, were a new phenomenon.   
Another key characteristic of the masses, which Arendt connects to their indifference was their 
apolitical character. The masses were indifferent people whom all other parties had given up and 
as a result, “the majority of [the masses’] membership consisted of people who never before had 
appeared on the political scene.” (Arendt 312). This point is confusing at first. If the masses 
regrouped people who used to belong to the class system, which we said earlier was made up of 
“citizens with opinions about, and interests in, the handling of public affairs” (Arendt 309), then 
how could they be apolitical? Arendt provides clarifications when shes explains that certain 
members of the class system were educated, trained and paid for politics as a job (Arendt 314). 
As a result, the majority of people “remained outside all party or other political organization” 
(Arendt 314) and left it up to those who, in a way, were ‘specialists’ in politics. Because people 
of the class system relied on these few members to represent them in the political world, they 
never felt the need to become political actors themselves. Their lack of political interest and 
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engagement indicates that they did not feel responsible for what happened in the public world 
(Arendt 314) and therefore, when the class system broke down, the great majority of those who 
became the masses had no political experience. The key point is that some members of the class 
system were involved, and simultaneously the majority was not. The masses were the huge 
numbers who typically sat out of politics. The combination of the masses’ selflessness and 
apolitical character led to utter loneliness.  
Loneliness is “the painful sense of exclusion from the work of the world and from the 
intercourse of human fellowship.” (McCarthy47) and what is unbearable about it is “the loss of 
one’s self” (Arendt 477). Because the masses were those individuals who never got involved in 
politics, they did not experience the meaningful coming together of people in public life to listen, 
speak and act amongst others. Instead, the masses established only social ties based on mutual 
economic interests and concerns, which, when the social structure of the class system broke 
down, were too weak to remain. Arendt insists on the fact that the chief characteristic of the mass 
man was not his backwardness but “his isolation and lack of social relationship.” (317). The 
collapse of the class system did not turn masses into brutes but into spiritually disconnected 
people who lost a sense of reality, something that depends upon interactions with others that can 
validate our belonging to a common world (Baehr 15). The masses lost personal meaning, their 
connections to others and to the world; they felt “abandoned by everything and everyone” 
(McCarthy 46).  
2. The erosion of authority  
Although the masses were a product of catastrophic upheaval through war, revolution and 
economic collapse, a deeper underlying crisis also played a role in their birth, but more 
importantly, in the propagation of a general feeling of spiritual disconnectedness. This crisis is 
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the erosion of authority, or what Arendt calls the ‘break in tradition’, not only in politics, but 
also in Western religion and morality. It is important to note that totalitarian movements did not 
create this crisis of authority; they simply took advantage of the fact that people were suddenly 
undergoing an existential crisis and craved consistency, meaning and a sense of home.  
 An important component of Arendt’s writing on the masses is the contrast she establishes 
between the masses, the mob, the elite (intellectuals and artists) and the bourgeoisie (also 
referred to as “philistines”). Although these groups were different from the masses, they too felt 
spiritually disconnected. I argue that Arendt’s distinctions create nuances within the masses. 
Before looking at the groups she distinguishes the masses from, we turn to her essay “What is 
Authority?” to better understand the erosion of authority. She begins by stipulating that, 
“authority has vanished from the modern world.” (1), giving place to a “constant, ever-widening 
and deepening crisis of authority” (1). Authority used to be rooted in the past and provide the 
world with “permanence and durability which human beings need precisely because they are 
(…) the most unstable and futile beings” (Arendt 3). Authority had been a stabilizing force that 
provided man, who is spontaneous by nature, with roots and a sense of belonging to the world. 
The loss of this guiding thread resulted in “general doubt” (Arendt 2) and uncertainty, as the 
beliefs and customs that created a common sense fell apart. In a world where there no longer 
was one truth to rely on and all the traditional banisters had disappeared, people were adrift.  
In The Political Humanism of Hannah Arendt, Michael McCarthy concisely summarizes the 
significant moments in the decline of ancestral authority: “the emancipation of secular power 
from ecclesiastical authority during the Italian Renaissance; (…) the rupture of Christian unity in 
the Reformation; (…) the pathos of novelty that animated the scientific revolution whose leading 
interpreters revolted against tradition; (…)” (51). More broadly, the seventeenth century was 
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marked by the West’s loss of a “securely anchored philosophical tradition as its guide to the 
past.” (McCarthy 51), and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the loss of “our common 
belief in the unifying dogmas of Christianity and in the metaphysical and theological foundations 
of the moral order.” (McCarthy 51). McCarthy’s analysis of the “dramatic breakdown of all 
traditional authorities” (Arendt 1) shows the progressive erosion of everything that had been a 
source of truth, consistency, and common understanding. With no common political, social, 
moral and spiritual foundations to act as a binding force, more and more people felt 
disconnected. In a world of confusion and doubt, communities came to be “held together by the 
bonds of unexamined customs and habits [and] were no longer able to give a persuasive account 
of their moral and spiritual foundations.” (McCarthy 51).  
What follows is not intended to be an in depth study of the mob, the elite and the bourgeoisie, 
but rather an overview to understand how the erosion of authority affected different groups. The 
mob was “primarily a group in which the residue of all classes are represented” (Arendt 107). In 
this regard, the mob resembled the masses who were also the “detritus of all social strata” (Baehr 
12). Interestingly, the mob was not only the refuse but also the “by-product of bourgeois 
society.” (Arendt 155). It lived off the bourgeoisie’s drive for expansion, in particular by trying 
its fortune in imperial adventures overseas (Swift 90). Linking the two together was an intriguing 
bond that reflected the bourgeoisie’s admiration for the mob and their shared “unbridled egoism” 
(Canovan 41). 
What differentiated the mob from the bourgeoisie though, is the fact that it was made up of 
individuals that were “both rootless and ruthless and who were particularly available for criminal 
activity.” (Canovan 53). This characteristic of the mob was a direct result of its being a power 
hungry group that was willing to do anything to gain power (Arendt 325). Although it is often 
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argued that members of the bourgeoisie were the same way, they hid it behind “hypocrisy” 
(Canovan 41). The bourgeois, or philistine, is the person who in the midst of the ruins of his 
world worried only about his private security (Arendt 338). It is precisely for this reason that that 
the selfless masses became violently hostile to bourgeois society (Swift 90). The mob’s drive for 
power is also what differentiated it from the masses who were only interested in “victory and 
success as such” (Arendt 350). The masses had no interest in the cause that may be victorious. 
The mob’s drive for power implied that it had interests and goals, which is precisely what we 
saw the masses lost when the class system broke down.  
The bourgeoisie was not the only group that the mob was tied to; it also developed a 
“disturbing” and “curious” (Arendt 337) temporary alliance with the elite (also referred to as ‘the 
intellectuals’). This amalgam is explained by the fact that these strata had been the first to be 
eliminated from the structure of the framework of class society and to feel adrift (Arendt 337). 
Totalitarian movements attracted the mob and the elite alike because of their pronounced 
activism and use of terrorism (Arendt 331). Terrorism was appealing because it was radically 
different from what had been done in past revolutionary societies. It became “a kind of 
philosophy through which to express frustration, resentment, and blind hatred” (Arendt 332), and 
get recognition. The mob saw recognition as a form of fame that gave “access to history” and 
power (Arendt 332), which it wanted above all. In the case of the elite, the exaltation of violence 
was due more specifically to the fact that it stood in stark contrast to the hypocritical morality of 
the bourgeoisie who they hated (Canovan 55).  
The erosion of authority combined with economic disaster and political impotence left the 
masses, the mob, the bourgeoisie and the elite with the unbearable weight of “wordlessness” 
(McCarthy 46). These groups felt as thought they had no place in the world - what Arendt refers 
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to as being “superfluous” (Arendt Origins 475). The distinctions she makes between these 
groups are indicative of different attempts to escape superfluoussness. The mob did so by 
seeking power and terror; the bourgeoisie by protecting its private security; and the elite by 
creating a strategic temporary alliance with the mob who had also been one of the first groups to 
suffer from the class breakdown.  
3. The fictitious home of totalitarian movements  
 
The masses’ attempt to escape superfluoussnes was expressed through their attraction to 
totalitarian movements. This attraction was in no way the result of ignorance or brainwashing 
(Arendt xxiii) but rather, the result of the masses being drawn to the movements’ ability to 
provide what I call a ‘fictitious home’. This fictitious home was appealing, as it provided 
consistency. The masses were not interested in facts, but “only the consistency of the system of 
which they [were] presumably part.” (Arendt 351). In a world where everything seemed to be 
falling apart, and the whole social structure that provided people with a sense of rootedness 
disappeared, totalitarian movements’ consistency was a source of comfort that numbed the angst. 
Movements created consistency through the “endless repetition of a few key ideas” (Baehr 13). 
As the same claims were made over and over again, they appeared to be “consistent, 
comprehensible and predictable” (Arendt 352), which created the illusion of coherence and 
stability. 
The masses’ acceptance of movements’ fictitious home reveals a certain “fanaticism” (Arendt 
307) about the masses, which Arendt differentiates from idealism. Idealism “always springs from 
some individual decision and conviction and is subject to experience and argument.” (307). The 
masses did not make any decision for this would have implied thinking critically about what the 
movements claimed and as we saw earlier, the masses suffered from the “complete loss of 
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individual claims and ambition” (Arendt 314). As long as the organizational framework of 
movements was consistent, “the fanaticized members [could] be reached by neither experience 
nor argument” (Arendt 308). The masses’ complete identification with movements and total 
conformism made it so that challenging movements’ ideas - which is what Arendt means by 
“subject to experience and argument” - was futile. Such loyalty can be expected “only from the 
completely isolated human being” (Arendt 323). The masses who had lost all social ties and self-
interest, saw totalitarian movements as the only way to have place in the world.  
The paradox of totalitarian movements is that they operated as much on consistency as they did 
on impermanence. Movements could remain in power “only so long as they [kept] moving and 
setting everything around them in motion” (Arendt 306). This is what Arendt refers to as “the 
perpetual-motion mania of totalitarian movements” (Arendt 306). Needing mass support to exist, 
movements were always moving forward to make sure their followers remained hooked. This 
constant motion was exemplified by new ideas, purges, wars, deportations, and the identification 
of every new objective enemy to liquidate (Baehr 13). Stillness would have meant giving 
followers space to think about the world as it really was, which movements knew would interfere 
with the “fiction” (Arendt 352) they had constructed. As long as the momentum was consistent, 
the masses were assuaged and subdued.  
The masses were not loyal to an interest but precisely to this fiction; a fiction that perfectly 
aligned with their longing for a “consistent, comprehensible, and predictable world” (Arendt 
352). The masses could not bear the reality of their spiritual disconnectedness and “social 
homelessness” (Arendt 352), so they gave up common sense in order to escape it. The home 
provided by totalitarian movements was fictitious because it would have been impossible to 
fulfill the needs of the masses without seriously conflicting with common sense. As Baehr 
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explains, the fiction presented the world in conspiratorial terms and reduced the world to one 
central tenet – class or race – from which everything else was derived (13). Moreover, it could 
not be debated for its vindication was to be found in an indefinite future. The fictitious home 
created by totalitarian movements was accepted as a “functioning reality” (Arendt 364) by the 
masses who, shorn of a common world of meaning, craved a home and derived “their sense of 
having a place in the world only from [their] belonging to a movement” (Arendt 324).  
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Chapter III 
 
Political invisibility: 
the homeless Jews, Boers and tribal nations of Europe 
 
In conversation with Hannah Arendt, the first two chapters of this project have established that 
homelessness originates both from rightlessness and spiritual disconnectedness. By studying the 
rightlessness of the stateless people and the spiritual disconnectedness of the masses, we find two 
experiences of homelessness. On the one hand, homelessness is experienced as a form of 
isolation, causing people to lose their place in the world. On the other hand, homelessness is 
experienced as a form of loneliness, causing people to feel as though they do not belong to the 
world at all. Although these are distinct experiences of homelessness, they present a 
commonality namely, the loss of meaning.  
Humans derive meaning from having a place in the public sphere, “a place in the world which 
makes opinions significant and actions effective” (Arendt 296). Arendt distinguishes three 
spheres of human life, the public, the private and the social. The public sphere is characterized 
by equality and constitutes the political space where everyone is equal and has the right to 
participate in the “human world of fellowship and purpose” (Arendt 189). The social sphere is 
the sphere of discrimination, which lies between the public and the private spheres. This is where 
people come together and form groups based on alikeness and common interests (Arendt, 
Reflections on Little Rock 51). Finally, the private sphere is characterized by uniqueness. This is 
the space within the protective four walls of the private home where people can live however 
they chose to. The public sphere is essential insofar as it is where human beings are seen and 
recognized by others. For Arendt, human existence becomes meaningful in public, and it is 
precisely from this sphere that the stateless and the masses were excluded.  
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This loss of meaning resulting from not having a home in the public world constitutes what 
Arendt calls the “basic experience” (474) of our century. In this regard, Arendt adds to Liebow 
and Weil’s claim that homelessness is about more than losing the roof over one’s head (as it is 
also about a spiritual uprootedness) by arguing that homelessness is a modern phenomenon 
stemming from political uprootedness as well. In this chapter I argue that homelessness 
originates from political invisibility. For this I turn to three groups Arendt writes about as being 
indicative of the dangers of living outside of the public world: the Jews, the Boers, and the tribal 
nations of Europe. The chapter begins by establishing the importance, for Arendt, of public life 
and how appearing in public provides human being with a home in the world. The chapter then 
presents a case study of the Jews who never built homes that had a political reality, and instead, 
established roots only in the private sphere. Next, the chapter moves onto a case study of the 
tribal nations of Europe. These were the pan movements composed of people who did not obtain 
the sovereignty of a nation-state because they never developed roots beyond their common 
ethnic consciousness. With no political institutions or enduring cultural achievements that they 
could claim, pan movements proclaimed their innate superiority on mystical bases, which 
rejected others’ claim to human dignity and made it impossible to build a common world. The 
chapter then looks at the Boers who led their lives completely divorced from the public sphere by 
isolating themselves and never working to produce anything of their own making.  
1. At home in public 
One of the key concepts of Arendt’s thinking is the ‘political’, which is to say public life.  
Humans create the public as a space in which they can act, speak and create a common world 
together. To act is “to take initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, 'to begin,' 'to lead,' and 
eventually 'to rule' indicates), to set something in motion. Because they are initium, newcomers 
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and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action.” (Arendt The 
Human Condition 177). Every human being has the ability to make new beginnings. For Arendt, 
freedom is enabled by this capacity to initiate, and this freedom is exercised through action, in 
public (Thuma). By acting together in the public realm, men create a common and enduring 
world that provides them with a home.  
The public realm is also a source of power, as “power always comes from men acting together” 
(Arendt Origins 474). When men act in concert and create a common world, they develop a 
common language and understanding that allows them to make claims about their human and 
political rights. They gain the power of recognition and agency, as the public realm makes it 
possible for man to appear before others. This appearance has existential effects insofar as 
Arendt views the public space as a kind of “stage” for the short-lived “performances” of the 
individual, which protects against the impermanence of human existence (Thuma). It is a space 
where one’s actions and words are seen and remembered. The public gives a reality and 
durability to human life, and to the world.  
The danger of leading a non public life is invisibility, which is to live a life that is without 
consequences and remains “excluded from the light of the public realm where excellence can 
shine” (Arendt, On Revolution 59). When one is invisible they lose the ability to act, “the 
relevance of speech” (Arendt 297) and “human relationships” (Arendt 297), and are therefore 
deprived “of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.” 
(Arendt Origins 296). To live only in the social sphere is also a form of invisibility because the 
social is ruled by discrimination, which is to say that it is where people come together and form 
groups based on alikeness and common interests (Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock 51). This 
conflicts with the public sphere’s principle of equality and drive to build of a common world, as 
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a unitary whole. When one lives only in the social realm, they can build a common world but 
only with certain people. A life led exclusively in the private sphere is another form of 
invisibility because one’s private world does not concern others. In private, actions cannot make 
themselves observable to others. The private is where one retreats from the public and the social.  
2. The Jews 
“[…] Jewish history, the history of a people without a government, without a country, and 
without a language.” 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
 
In part one of the Origins of Totalitarianism, “Antisemitism”, Hannah Arendt writes the story 
of the Jews of Europe. For Arendt, the Jews were indicative of a group that did not establish a 
public identity and for this reason, had no power to resist the evils of totalitarianism. At the core 
of the Jews’ history is “a people without a government, without a country, and without a 
language.” (Arendt 8) that settled in inhospitable environments (Abbarno 227). Without a 
country of their own to define them territorially, or a government to represent and protect them, 
or a language that was the product of having a space in which to appear and speak, the Jews 
lacked “political ability and judgment” (Arendt 8). They never developed the skills developed in 
public and were therefore, “politically naïve” (Nye 155).  
Instead of consolidating a group identity in public, the Jews relied on a special protected status 
(outside of politics) provided to them by the state. In the late seventeen century, the state found 
itself needing a considerable amount of credit to expand its sphere of economic influence. The 
Jews who were known for their age-old experience as moneylenders, were the only group in 
Europe to agree to financially support the state. Doing so meant that they were also the only 
group to tie its destiny to the state’s development (Arendt 17). In return for the Jews’ financial 
aid, the state granted them “special protection” (Arendt 13) in the form of privileges. Granting 
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the Jews privileges was a strategic move on the part of the state insofar as it compensated the 
Jews for their services, but also prevented them from assimilating with the rest of the population, 
which was hostile to the state (Arendt 13). From that moment on, the Jews’ place in society was 
increasingly defined by their relationship to the state and therefore, by exception.  
This special relationship with the state prevented the Jews from “submersion in the class 
system as well as their own establishment as a class.” (Arendt 13) and set them apart from the 
rest of society. By relying only on their ties with the state to preserve their group identity, the 
Jews existed outside the public realm and outside the class system. Since the body politic the 
Jews were defined by “had not other social reality, they were socially speaking, in the void” 
(Arendt 14). The rest of society became skeptical of the Jews’ alliance with the state and 
perceived it as “self-preservation and group survival” (Arendt 13).  
The Jews’ reliance on high authority not only excluded them from society, but also prevented 
them from developing political knowledge or practice. The Jews were the group with the most 
ties to the body politic and yet, with the least political interest. The Jews’ lack of political life 
kept them outside the public sphere, which meant that they did not have the practice of appearing 
and being seen by others. This lack of practice resulted in the Jews never cultivating agency for 
purposes of self-defense (Arendt 24). Their aloofness from society and political ignorance made 
them blind to “the moment when social discrimination changed into a political argument” 
(Arendt 25). The classes that had been in conflict with the state all became antisemitic because 
the Jews were the only group that represented the state. When German politics turned against the 
Jews, they had no say in the political process and no grounds to fight for their rights since they 
had never gained visibility and power by establishing themselves in public.  
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The Jews could have gained power from the fact that they were “an inter-European element” 
(Arendt 19) with inter-European connections and credit at their disposal. However, they did not 
use this advantageous position to achieve purposes of their own (Canovan 46). The Jews never 
formed an organized “international financial entity” (Arendt 16) and repetitively neglected 
chances for “normal capitalist enterprise and business” (Arendt 14). Instead, it was the “bonds of 
blood and family ties” (Arendt 27) that connected the dispersed pockets of Jews across Europe. 
Aside from their state defined status, the Jews determined their place in the world exclusively in 
the private realm. Doing well economically and with the state behind them, the Jews lived 
comfortably in private and did not feel the need to be politically responsible (Canovan 52). 
Without a place in public though, the common world they built was a private one that no political 
reality. For Arendt, the Jews’ apolitical behavior and reliance on the state was their downfall, as 
it made it easy for states to make them superfluous when politics turned against them. Since the 
Jews were not politically aware and had no built a home in public, they had no agency to fight 
the loss of their place in the world.  
3. The tribal nations of Europe 
 
“Rootlessness was the true source of that “enlarged tribal consciousness” which actually meant 
that members of these peoples had no definite home but felt at home wherever other members of 
their “tribe” happened to live.” 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
Tribal nationalism emerged amongst the migrating populations resulting from Austria-Hungary 
and Czarist Russia’s constantly changing borders. Pan-German and pan-Slavic movements were 
the coming together of peoples who, because they had always been on the move, had not struck 
deep enough roots in their respective nations to participate in national emancipation. In other 
words, they had not established a public world that was recognized and valued by others. 
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Tribalism became the nationalism of the “suppressed minorities like the Slavs in Austria and 
the Poles in Czarist Russia.” (Arendt 228) who were denied emancipation and the sovereignty of 
a nation-state (Arendt 227). 
Nations were emancipated and became nation-states when they “entered the scene of history 
and […] acquired a consciousness of themselves as cultural and historical entities, and of their 
territory as a permanent home” (Arendt 229). To become a nation-state a nation had to reflect a 
binding history and identity that came out of having a place in the world. The pan movements 
did not enter the scene of history because their nationality had not “yet developed beyond the 
inarticulateness of ethnic consciousness” (Arendt 231). Moreover, their languages remained a 
dialect and they failed to develop a strong attachment to the land (Arendt 231).  
For Arendt, the tribal nations of Europe come out of this “atmosphere of rootlessness” (232) - 
an atmosphere marked by the absence of a common cultural identity and of a definite home. 
Instead of deriving a sense of meaning and place by building a common world, the pan 
movements relied on clan-shared traits. Their home was wherever other members of the “tribe” 
(232) were. The pan-German and pan-Slavic movements’ adherents “had not the slightest idea of 
the meaning of patria or patriotism” (Arendt 232) and “could only point to themselves” (Arendt 
232) as the basis of their place in the world. Consequently, these peoples’ national quality 
“appeared to be much more of a portable private matter, inherent in their very personality, than a 
matter of public concern and civilization.” (Arendt 231).  
With no political institutions or enduring cultural achievements that they could claim, pan 
movements proclaimed the innate superiority of their German or Slavic “souls” (Arendt 232; 
Tsao 125), which resulted in claims of absolute chosenness based on belonging to “the people 
singled out for divine origin” (Arendt 233). Their national quality fell back on some “mysterious 
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inherent psychological or physical quality” (Arendt 240), which rejected the idea of a common 
origin for Man. Pan movements transformed into “completely uprooted, racially indoctrinated 
hordes” (Arendt 242) that escaped mankind’s “common sharing of responsibility” (Arendt 235). 
It was impossible for the tribal nations of Europe to be at home in the reality they had 
constructed – a reality in which only the “rules of the animal kingdom [could] possibly apply to 
its political destinies” (Arendt 235), and which therefore rejected others’ claim to human dignity. 
4. The Boers  
 
“[the Boers’] fantastic treks, […] showed clearly that they had transformed themselves into a 
tribe and lost the European’s feeling for a territory, a patria of their own. They behaved exactly 
like the black tribes who had also roamed the Dark Continent for centuries – feeling at home 
wherever the horde happened to be, and fleeing like death every attempt at definite settlement.” 
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
 
The Boers were descended from Dutch colonists who had settled at the Cape of Hope after 
1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a staging post there. They were “the first 
European group to become completely alienated from the pride which Western man felt in living 
in a world created and fabricated by himself.” (Arendt 194). The Boers’ lifestyle was completely 
divorced from Western traditions and from a public world. They rejected the belief that man “can 
produce equality through organization [..] and build a common world, together with his equals 
and only with his equals.” (Arendt 301). 
The Boers’ living conditions in the African wilderness “escaped the reality of civilization” 
(Arendt 190) and of a “human-built world” (Arendt 197) primarily because they lived in total 
isolation. The extremely bad soil made it impossible to build settlements and reproduce the 
village organization of their homeland. As a result, the Boers opted to live separate from one 
another. Isolated by broad spaces of wilderness (Arendt 191), they quickly “lost both their 
peasant relationship to the soil and their civilized feeling for human fellowship” (Arendt 193).  
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Instead of developing an organized community, the Boers followed a kind of “clan 
organization” (Arendt 191). There was no body politic, no communal organization, and no 
territory definitely colonized for the Boers to form an identity around (Arendt 193). The fact that 
they were Boers and shared a language was their only defining trait. Their human self-
consciousness - similarly to the tribal nations of Europe - did not derive from “their status as 
expressions of capacities common to all human beings” (Tsao 123), but rather from an externally 
determined fact about themselves. Arendt’s account of the Boers’ rapid degeneration from a 
civilized people into a ‘clan’ shows that any attempt to ground one’s human dignity on a 
contingent trait like ethnic descent or the color of one’s skin prevents the most basic human 
capacity for action and the creation of a common built world (Tsao 122). 
The Boers’ rootlessness and lack of a home in the public world was “a natural result of early 
emancipation from work” (Arendt 197) and “contempt for labor” (Arendt 193). Work and labor 
are of key importance in Arendt’s understanding of public life, as work produces permanent 
things to make up the human world (such as works of art and furniture), and labor produces what 
man needs to survive (such as food) (Franek). Lazy and unproductive, the Boers rejected both 
work and labor. They never made the effort to mold their surroundings into a human landscape 
and create a sense of stability. The Boers deserted the soil as soon as crops no longer gave and 
the animals had all been hunted. This meant that they were continually on the move, and never 
built permanent dwelling places. In fact, they would abandon their homes and farms at the 
slightest provocation and go deeper into the interior wilderness of the country (Arendt 194). The 
Boers’ great treks further inland became their way of life. 
The Boers depended entirely on slavery for productivity. However, only a small portion of the 
African tribes was enslaved and as a result, the slave labor barely sufficed to keep the Boers alive 
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(Arendt 193). Having no interest in achieving an organized and sustainable way of living, they 
preferred to move whenever natural resources ran out and to have no attachments. For Arendt, 
the Boers’ “vegetat[ive] (Arendt 19) existence and ruling over the African tribes in “absolute 
lawlessness” (Arendt 193) destroyed their sense of human purpose and responsibility, making it 
impossible for them to build a home in a common world.   
Arendt draws a parallel between the Boers’ way of life and that of the native African tribes who 
lived in “hostile nature” (190). The African tribes “treated nature as their undisputed master” 
(Arendt 192) and behaved like they were a part of it. Their world of nature had no human reality 
because they never created a human world out of it through action. Instead, the African tribes 
would flee as soon as nature no longer yielded what they needed - a habit the Boers came to 
imitate. The African tribes’ way of life, Arendt argues, seemed to lack the “specifically human 
character” that comes with building a “specifically human reality” (Arendt 192). Because they 
had nothing permanent to claim their identity, the African tribes existed “without the future of a 
purpose and the past of an accomplishment” (Arendt 190). 
By drawing a parallel between the Boers and the African tribes, Arendt shows that the Boers 
reverted to a “natural” (Arendt 192), pre-political way of life. The Jews, the Boers, and the tribal 
nations of Europe exemplify the danger of becoming superfluous as a result of not being rooted 
in a political community. These three groups, like the stateless and the masses, became 
superfluous: the Nazis exterminated the Jews; the British put the Boers in concentration camps; 
and the tribal nations of Europe disappeared. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Refugee camps: 
spaces of homelessness  
 
“refugee camps (…) often become places where people are born and die waiting to go home.”   
- Alessandro Petti, “Architecture of Exile” 
 
The stateless people’s rightlessness, the masses’ spiritual disconnectedness, and the Jews, 
Boers and tribal nations of Europe’s political invisibility led them to be homeless in different 
ways. The stateless experienced homelessness as a form of isolation; the masses experienced it 
as a form of loneliness; and the Jews, the Boers, and the tribal nations of Europe experienced it 
as a form of powerlessness. Moreover, the origins of homelessness identified in the fist three 
chapters of this project reveal that to be homeless is to be meaningless.   
For Arendt, the stateless, the masses, the Jews, the Boers and the tribal nations of Europe were 
indicative of meaninglessness, as they had all, in one way or another, lost their place in the 
world. However, she predicted that the stateless - whose condition she believed to be identical to 
that of refugees (279) - in particular would become “the most symptomatic group in 
contemporary politics.” (277). Contemporary politics, Arendt argues, are marked by the 
discrepancy between human rights being inalienable and enjoyed only by citizens belonging to a 
state, and the situation of displaced people, who lose the protection of their rights (Arendt 279) 
because they have no legal rights as citizens. If contemporary politics are characterized by a 
human rights paradox that leaves those who do not belong to a political community homeless, 
then displaced people are indeed symptomatic of them. Devoid of a place to call home, shorn of 
rights, cut off from ties to others, and denied a political identity, displaced people become 
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homeless; and the roughly fifty-nine point five million forcibly displaced people in the world 
today (UNHCR) are a clear indication of the overwhelming homelessness of our age.  
Faced with “homelessness on an unprecedented scale, [and] rootlessness to an unprecedented 
depth.” (Arendt viii), we must ask how this phenomenon is being dealt with. What is the 
response to mass homelessness? What becomes of refugees? For Arendt, internment camps have 
become “the routine solution” (279), “the only practical substitute for a nonexistent homeland” 
(284); an indisputable claim when faced with the fact that over thirty-four million people live in 
refugee camps across the world today (UNHCR). In this chapter I argue that refugee camps are 
spatial manifestations of homelessness. Moreover, I argue that camps are a solution to the 
refugee problem that does not change refugees’ homeless condition; in fact, refugee camps leave 
it in limbo. The chapter begins by placing the emergence of refugee camps within the larger 
history of camps as modern spaces of confinement for bothersome populations who do not fit the 
framework of the law. Next, the chapter moves onto the key characteristics of refugee camps and 
how these mirror the tripartite origins of homelessness. Refugee camps are spaces of exception 
that are geographically marginalized. Completely isolated, they are excluded from the normal 
order and deprived of public, social and private life. The chapter then looks at different 
architectural attempts at challenging the homelessness of refugee camps.  
1. Understanding the camp  
a) A century of camps 
Originating from the Latin word campus meaning “level ground”, the term ‘camp’ is a 
reference to the Campus Martius of Ancient Rome where practices such as athletics and military 
drills took place (Grbac 6). In the modern day, the purpose of camps has changed significantly, 
as they have become the preferred means of containing unwanted populations. The Cuban camps 
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in which the Spanish put thousands of Cuban civilians during the War of Independence (1895-
98) were arguably the first camps to exist (Agamben 166, Kreienbaum 897). Following the 
Cuban camps were those created by the British during the second Anglo-Boer War in South 
Africa (1899-1902), in which the Boers were “concentrated” (Agamben 166). Shortly afterward, 
during the Herero Wars (1904-1908), the German Empire created concentration camps to rid 
German South-West Africa (modern-day Namibia) of the Herero tribe (Grbas 9). Arising after 
1929 were the Soviet forced labor camp systems known as ‘Gulag’. Around the same time, the 
Nazis created the most extreme form of camps. These were the concentration and extermination 
camps in which mainly Jews and Soviet prisoners of war were sent.  
This brief history of the origins of camps shows that although they differed in purpose, - 
ranging from containing displaced populations, via forced labor, to extermination - they have 
become an essential part of modern history (Kreienbaum 896). So much so that Zygmunt 
Bauman views the twentieth century “the ‘Age of camps’ ” (Bauman 267) and Giorgio Agemben 
claims camps have become the “ ‘nomos’ of the modern” (Agamben 166). For Bauman, nothing 
was more “unexpected than Auschwitz and the Gulag, and none could be more bewildering, 
shocking and traumatic” (Bauman 267). The shadows cast by the scientifically designed and 
administered killing of human beings in Auschwitz and the Gulag “seem by far the longest and 
likely to dominate any picture we may paint.” (Bauman 267). 
 In his famous work, Homo Sacer, Agamben also roots the concept of the camp in the horrors 
that took place in the camps of the Holocaust. Similarly to Bauman, Agamben believes that these 
camps created a particular type of space where people’s lives were regarded as worthless, and 
could therefore be killed with impunity (Robinson). This is where the figure of homo sacer 
comes into play: “homo” means “human”/”man” and “sacer” means “sacred” and taboo”. Homo 
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sacer is the one who can be killed but not sacrificed to the Gods because they are defined 
outside what is recognized as valued life and not worth sacrificing (Robinson) - in Arendt’s 
terms, homo sacer is the superfluous person. For Agamben, the camp as a space of confinement 
for populations that have become superfluous originates particularly from the Nazi camps but is 
not limited to them. In fact, the reason why the camp has become “the nomos of the political 
space in which we are still living” (166), he argues, is because “we find ourselves virtually in the 
presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crime that 
are committed and whatever its denomination and specific topography.” (174). For Agamben, 
camps are ever present whether it be the Bari stadium into which the Italian police in 1991 
temporarily placed illegal Albanians before deporting them, or the Vêlodrome d’Hiver in Paris 
where the Vichy authorities held Jews before handing them over to the German, or the zones 
d’attentes in French international airports where people asking for refugee status are detained 
(Agamben 174). 
The danger of being declared homo sacer is built into the experience of life in societies ruled 
by states (Robinson), and “signals the political space of modernity itself” (Agamben 174). 
Camps, he argues, are “produced at the point at which the political system of the modern nation-
state (…) enters into a lasting crisis.” (Agamben 174-5). Similarly to Arendt’s writing on 
statelessness, Agamben sees the nation-state being founded on the bond between “a determinate 
localization (land) and a determinate order (the State) and mediated by automatic rules for the 
inscription of life (birth or the nation)” (Agamben 175) as problematic.  
Faced with people who do not fit this framework and challenge the “old nomos” (Agamben 
175), states decide to “assume directly the care of the nation’s biological life as one of its tasks.” 
(Agamben 175). This means the state has the sovereignty of “recognition and derecognition” 
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(Robinson) of human life, and that those judged to be anomalies or problems are excluded. 
Modern states have created the camp as “the new, hidden regulator of the inscription of life in 
the order” (175). Agamben provides Yugoslavia as a contemporary example to support his 
argument that the breakdown of the nation-state has led to the “dislocation of populations and 
human lives along entirely new lines of flight” and that the camp is “the new biopolitical nomos 
of the planet.” (Agamben 176). Those who are excluded and placed in camps become homo 
sacer because they enter “a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, 
licit and illicit” (Agamben 170). Operating outside the normal order, the camps suspends a 
person’s identity and rights - concepts such as “subjective right and juridical protection” 
(Agamben 170) lose their meaning. This loss of “political status […] reduce[s] to bare life” 
(Agamben 171).  
b) The ever-present danger of the Nazi concentration camps 
Arendt argues that camps are “the most consequential institution of totalitarian rule” (Arendt 
441). They are methods of “total domination” (Arendt 438) that reflect the belief that 
“everything is possible” (Arendt 437) - that a world of utter monstrosity can be created. 
According to her, there are three types of concentration camps. The first are “DP camps, which 
are nothing other than camps for persons who have become superfluous and bothersome” 
(Arendt 445). These are the “mildest forms” (Arendt 445) of concentration camps where people 
such as refugees and the stateless are placed. The second are the “Soviet Union’s labor camps” 
(Arendt 445). Finally, there are the camps created by the Nazis, which she writes are equivalent 
to “Hell” (445). At the core of the camp as a concept are “human masses sealed off […] [and] 
treated as if they no longer exist” (Arendt 445). When one has lost their home in the world and 
become superfluous, the only solution is camps. The ‘mildest’ consequence of homelessness is 
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internment camps, and the severest is the Nazi concentration camps, which, because they are 
part of history, are an ever-present danger. 
These camps not only “degrade[d] human beings, but also serve[d] as the ghastly experiment of 
eliminating […] spontaneity itself as an expression of human behavior and of transforming the 
human personality into a mere thing” (Arendt 438). The Nazi camps destroyed humans’ virtue of 
birth, namely, the ability to create beginnings and act. In other words these camps not only 
contained superfluous people, but also made sure that these people’s superfluoussness was 
absolute. This was done in three steps. First, the “juridical person in man” (Arendt 447) was 
killed. To kill the juridical person in man is to create a person who is no longer a legal person; to 
create a person who no longer has rights. The Nazis did so by continuously arresting and 
imprisoning people “arbitrar[ily]” (Arendt 449). The fact that one’s presence in the camp had 
absolutely no “connections with some definitive actions” (Arend 449) created a space “outside 
the protection of the law” (Arendt 447), where everyone and anyone could be sent. In the face of 
arbitrariness, hanging onto one’s rights becomes useless. The Nazi concentration camps 
destroyed man’s rights not only by making him rightless, but also by making him believe that his 
right to claim rights was worthless. The killing of the juridical man is the “prerequisite” (Arendt 
451) for total domination. 
 The second step was “the murder of the moral person in man” (Arendt 452). This was done by 
“making death anonymous” (Arendt 452). Human beings’ deaths were robbed of their “meaning 
as the end of a fulfilled life” (Arendt 452). Once a person was rightless and deprived of meaning, 
total domination was “really total” (Arendt 452), and it was possible to kill man’s “unique 
identity” (Arendt 453), which is to say man’s “spontaneity” (Arendt 453). When human beings’ 
ability to begin something new is destroyed, they are so dehumanized that they become 
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“marionettes” (Arendt 453). For Arendt, “the danger of the corpse factories and holes of 
oblivion is that today, with […] homelessness everywhere on the increase, masses of people are 
continuously rendered superfluous” (459). 
2. Extraterritoriality, exception and exclusion 
In the final chapter of Homo Sacer, “The Camp as the ‘Nomos’ of the Modern”, Agamben tries 
to answer the question “What is a camp” (166). Looking at the very first camps created by the 
Spanish in Cuba and those in which the English put the Boers, Agamben determines the initial 
characteristics of the camp, namely, “a state of emergency linked to a colonial war” (Agamben 
166) and “a state of exception and martial law” (Agamben 167). This is echoed in the Nazi Lager 
where the juridical basis for internment was not common law but “Schutzhaft (literally, 
protective custody)” (Agamben 167). This measure made it possible for people to be taken into 
custody regardless or any criminal behavior and simply on the considerations of “danger to the 
security of the state” (Agamben 167). The first concentration camps in Germany were those run 
by the Social Democratic governments that interned communist militants and Eastern European 
Jews in the “Konzentrationlager für Ausländer” (Agamben 167) (concentration camp for 
foreigners), both on the basis of Schutzhaft. 
Agamben argues, “the nexus between the state of exception and the concentration camp” (168) 
is key in understanding the nature of the camp because “The camp is the space that is opened 
when the state of exception begins to become the rule.” (168-9). Although camps are meant to be 
only temporary states of exception, they are given a “permanent spatial arrangement, which as 
such nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (Agamben 169) and creates “the 
paradoxical status as a space of exception”. In other words, the camp is an exceptional space that 
is both “outside the normal juridical order” (Agamben 170) and inside of it because “what is first 
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taken into the juridical order is the state of exception itself.” (Agamben 170). As a result, the 
difference between the normal order and the state of exception is blurred and the camp becomes 
“a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable.” (Agamben 
170).  
Agamben’s analysis of the camp leads him to define it as the “materialization of the state of 
exception and (…) the subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule 
enter into a threshold of indistinction.” (174). His analysis of the camp strongly echoes French 
anthropologist Michel Agier’s claim that at the root of the “camp solution” (183) is a socio-
spatial organization that aims at distancing and confining the “undesirables” (183), and that this 
organization is “recognizable by the fact that they combine (…) traits of extraterritoriality, 
exception and exclusion.” (280). Agier develops his tripartite characterization of spaces of 
encampment by arguing that refugee camps are “out-places” (Managing the Undesirables 180) 
that are constituted as “outsides” (Agier 180). As a result of being placed on the outskirts of local 
communities, fenced in, and rarely marked on official maps (Turner 3), refugee camps become 
marginalized spaces. This marginalization sets camps outside the “limits of the normal order of 
things” (Agier 180), creating a “situation of exception” (Agier 81) and what Agier refers to as  
the “experience of a double exclusion from locality” (180).  
Refugees are excluded not only from their place of origin, but also from the local population 
where the camp is established (180). As uprooted people who are not integrated into the normal 
order because of the camps’ state of exception, refugees come to occupy “a subaltern position 
imposed by the double handicap of not being ‘home’ and being almost totally destitute.” (181). 
In this regard, refugee camps being exceptional spatial peripheries further accentuate refugees’ 
homelessness. They live “outside of the places and outside of the time of a common, ordinary 
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predictable world.” (Agier Between War and City 323) as “pariahs”(Agier 28) and “outcasts” 
(Agier 181).  
For the architect Alessandro Petti, the combination of refugee camps being ‘out-places’ and 
spaces where people occupy a ‘subaltern position’ creates a suspension from the surrounding 
legal, social and political order, problematizing “the very idea of a city as a functional political 
community and democratic space.” (Petti “Architecture of Exile”). Petti understands the city as 
an urban form of human political community where one exercises rights of citizenship (Grbac 3) 
and like Arendt, he believes that a person’s political identity is exercised and played out in the 
public space of the city (Petti). In a New York Times article on refugee camps, Michael 
Kimmelman recounts his conversation with Petti on public spaces. Petti explains how the state of 
exception of refugee camps eliminates the possibility of a public realm and creates “a void of a 
political order” (Petti “Architecture of Exile”). Refugee camps are the “anti-city” (Petti) and it is 
precisely for this reason that refugees have ‘subaltern positions’; because they are stripped of the 
political rights one obtains and enacts in public (Petti). In Arendt’s words, refugees, like the 
stateless, lose their “place in a community, [their] political status […], and the legal personality 
which makes [their] actions and part of its destiny in a consistent whole” (301).  
Deprived of a state of their own and of a political community that guarantees rights, refugees 
become humanitarian cases (Agier 214) that necessitate a humanitarian space. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations are the sovereign 
power in these spaces, and create what Agier refers to as “humanitarian governments” (201). 
These humanitarian governments define their own space “as one of exception, a frontier, an out-
place” (Agier 213), which is meant to “[treat] and [manage]” (Agier 213) undesirable 
populations who no longer have any framework in which to exercise their citizenship. Because 
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humanitarian governance operates under “other legal instruments than the surrounding areas.” 
(Turner 3), Agier argues that they act “against politics” (Agier 215) insofar as they are produce 
exceptionality and prevent “nameless victims” (Agier 214) from reclaiming a political identity. 
Refugees’ loss of political identity and exclusion from the normal order is accentuated by the 
temporality of refugee camps, which Agier argues is paradoxical. As established by both 
Agamben and Agier, an emergency situation and its exceptional character justify the creation of 
refugee camps, and therefore make them temporary spaces. However, time in refugee camps  is 
suspended and becomes long lasting (Agier 71). This is what Petti refers to as “the prolonged 
exceptional temporality of the refugee camps” (“Architecture of Exile”), and what film director, 
producer and essayist Eyal Sivan calls the “permanent temporary solution” (“On the Palestinian 
Refugee Camps as a Permanent Temporary Solution Regime”). As a consequence of this 
“suspension of time” (Agier 77), refugee camps and life within them are excluded from history 
(Agier 79). There can be no past or future in refugee camps, only an enduring present. The only 
meaning that can therefore be ascribed to refugee camps’ “present that never ends” (Agier 78) is 
“waiting” (Agier 77). Whether it’s waiting to return home, waiting for paper work to be 
processed, or waiting for the arrival of humanitarian food, everyday life in the camp existence on 
“ ‘stand-by’ “(Agier 72).  
Since camps exist within “a temporal reality […] that is provisional by definition” (Agier 79) 
and refugees are “deemed to be waiting only to leave” (Agier 79), there is no history to write and 
treasure (Agier 79). Moreover, there is no point in building a home when one hopes to return to 
the one they have lost. The consequence of camps’ suspended temporality echoes the Arendtian 
consequences of not having a public world. Since time in refugee camps is suspended, it 
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becomes impossible for refugees to form a consciousness of themselves based on a shared 
history and place in the world that has any significance outside the space of the camp.  
3. Attempts at homemaking 
This temporality paradox coincides with the material construction of refugee camps. Their 
structures are the scene of an ongoing tension between permanent and definitive settlements 
(Sivan "On the Palestinian Refugee Camp as a Permanent Temporary Solution Regime”); of an 
“aesthetic of temporariness” (Abourahme 207). Refugee camps are meant to be materialization 
of temporary architecture (Petti “Architecture of Exile”) and to this effect are most often made of 
tents and shelters that are designed to be assembled and removed easily, and quickly. However, 
the indefinite temporality of camps necessarily leads its occupants to try and make the space into 
a home, in order to live with more dignity (Agier 53). Julia Peteet, an anthropologist who 
specializes in the study of Palestinian refugee camps, writes that the tent structure in refugee 
camps becomes a “despised symbol of misery and homelessness” (109), yet at the same time, the 
move away from tents is a threatening sign of permanence.  
Improving the living conditions within refugee camps is a very controversial point. Refugees’ 
homeless is expressed in the precarity and transience of refugee camps’ appearance: tents, 
exposed sewage, etc (Abourahme 207) - camps become the “living archive of displacement” 
(Abourahme 207). Any move toward “Improving and ‘diluting’ the camp, blending or 
integrating it into the surrounding landscape so that it loses its spatial discernability” 
(Abourahme 207) is seen as giving up on returning. However, both Agier and Peteet have 
observed that with time, refugees inevitably start building huts and cabins out of mud-brick and 
wood (Agier 54), and eventually, out of cement. This progression is gradual; first a cement block 
foundation one to two feet in height is constructed around the perimeter of the tent to protect it 
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from the rain and drafts, and then, the building moves upward (Peteet 109). The evolution 
from cloth tents that are foldable and removable, to more concrete structures like cement huts is 
the material reality of the temporality paradox of refugee camps, and the indication of refugees’ 
search for home amidst homelessness. 
Architect Alessandro Petti’s work focuses precisely on challenging this idea that any 
improvement in infrastructure and housing in refugee camps is an erosion of the right to return. 
He argues that increasingly, “improved living conditions (…) do not necessarily conflict with the 
right of return. Today, refugees are re-inventing social and political practices that improve their 
everyday life.” (Petti). For Petti, this radical transformation is a positive thing as long as it does 
not normalize the political condition of being exiled. His most important project that challenges 
the idea of the camp as a site of marginalization, poverty and political subjugation, is the public 
space he created with his architect wife, Sandi Hilal, in the Fawwar refugee camp, in the West 
Bank.  
As pointed out in Micheal Kimmelman’s lastest essay on the importance of public spaces and 
Petti and Hilal’s project, there are no public and private spaces in refugee camps - “Concepts like 
inside and outside are blurred” (“The Craving for Public Spaces). The idea of creating a public 
space like Petti and Hilal’s plaza was “mostly unheard-of in Palestinian camps across the West 
Bank.” (Kimmelman “Refugees Reshape Their Camp”). The project was initially met with 
skepticism, as it seemed to conflict with the right of return. After negotiations and five years of 
work, Fawwar refugee camp’s Square opened in 2012. The Square is “the sole, common space in 
the camp where all people of different ages and genders can have access. A place where women, 
men, children, young, old can have different activities.” (Alhmouz and Alturshan 23). The square 
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has become a communal space where classes and meetings such as those of the Woman’s 
Center take place, and where community meals are cooked (Alhmouz and Alturshan 57). 
Similarly to the square, The Phoenix Cultural Center in Dehesha refugee camp, in the West 
Bank, challenges the assumption that “as long as refugees [live] in horrible conditions, their 
suffering [will] pressure the international community to enact their right of return.” (Petti 
“Beyond the State”). The Center is a multi-story social and cultural built on a site originally 
designed for the construction of a prison. Refugees, through organized demands took over the 
site, and within a few months built a cultural center instead (Petti). The Phoenix Center 
“demonstrates the rich social and cultural values of the refugees in exile, and at the same time 
opens new forms of thinking, fighting, and action for the right of return.” (Petti). The community 
life created by the Center with a hall for meetings and a library, Petti argues, is not to be 
understood as a sign of refugees forgetting their homes or giving up, but a human response to a 
dehumanizing situation. It is a way to give refugees agency and the possibility to convene. Agier 
and Petti both support this claim by underlining that refugees still want to leave the camp “even 
if they have become places of identity or have a social, cultural, and even possibly political 
anchoring.” (Agier “From Refugees the Ghetto Is Born” 285) and return to their real homes.  
It is examples such as the Square in the Phoenix Cultural Center that have brought Agier to 
witness the “possibility for escape (…), something unexpected in the a present that seems to be 
the sole beginning and end of time in the waiting zone” (Managing the Undesirables 80). With 
the years, shelters turn into “almost pretty huts” (Agier 80), rudimentary market places appear 
and critical opinions on confinement “sometimes [transform] into written lists of demands” 
(Agier 80). However, Agier is more skeptical than Petti and Hilal. According to him, even 
though these elements prove that social, political and cultural acts can come to exist and 
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challenge the suspended temporality of refugee camps, “[the] political life that [is] observed 
there has hardly any other possibility of developing other than provisionally, discreetly or 
illegally.” (80). For Agier, as long as refugees live in a state of exception, they remain non-
citizens and their actions are non-recognizable to the world outside the camp (Agier “From 
Refuge the Ghetto is Born” 278) - in Arendt’s words, these attempts at homemaking do not have 
a “human reality” (Arendt 192). In fact, because they take place within a state of exception, she 
would argue that they are closer to private acts of homemaking. 
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Conclusion 
 
When I first began reading about the Syrian refugee crisis, I was struck by the word ‘home’ and 
the semantic field of destitution it was accompanied by. I remember thinking that at the heart of 
this crisis is a profound homelessness. When one hears the word ‘homelessness’, what often 
comes to mind is domestic homelessness. There are many obvious differences between refugees 
and people living in the streets or in shelters; yet, in both cases, people find themselves without a 
home. Although the reasons for this loss are different, something in the experience of this loss is 
shared. These initial thoughts led me to look past homelessness as the lack of a physical dwelling 
and craft a more complex understanding. I sought the origins of homelessness. The 
phenomenological approach asks us to understand homelessness beyond its conceptualization, to 
study how it appears and the way it is given in experience.  
In conversation with Hannah Arendt’s writing, specifically The Origins of Totalitarianism, I 
have identified three origins of homelessness. The first origin of homelessness is rightlessness. 
The stateless people’s rightlessness deprived them from the ability to build a home anywhere in 
the world. The second origin is spiritual disconnectedness. The masses’ spiritual 
disconnectedness left them craving for a sense of home in the world. The third origin of 
homelessness is political invisibility. The Jews, the Boers, and the tribal nations of Europe’s 
political invisibility made it impossible for their private homes to be recognized. These origins 
reveal different experiences of homelessness. Rightless, the stateless were no longer recognized 
as human. Spiritually disconnected, the masses felt as though they no longer had a place in the 
world. Politically invisible, the Jews, the Boers and the tribal nations of Europe were powerless. 
Taken together, these three origins show that homelessness is the experience of meaninglessness.  
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Marked by the making of borders and the formation of nation-states, this century coincides 
with the rise of refugee camps as the only solution to the emergence of the figure of the refugee. 
Starting with the refugees of World War I, the last hundred years bear witness to Russian 
refugees, Armenian refugees, Ethiopian refugees, World War II refugees, Balkan refugees, 
Palestinian refugees, Rwandan refugees, Afghan refugees, to name just a few. Today, with an 
overwhelming nine million Syrians seeking refuge (UNHCR), the Syrian refugee crisis has 
become the worst refugee crisis of our time. 
To look at the space of the refugee camp is to look at the physical manifestation of 
homelessness. There is something extremely powerful about refugee camps being defined spaces 
that concentrate people who can no longer occupy a space in the world. They are the only 
solution to homelessness and yet, they perpetuate it by being trapped between the lost homeland 
and the unpredictable future. Suspended in time, isolated, outside the normal order, and deprived 
of public and private spaces, refugee camps make it incredibly challenging for refugees to 
reclaim meaning.  
My visit to the Lebach refugee camp sadly confirmed this project’s findings. The experience of 
meaninglessness was overwhelming in the stories that Syrian refugees shared with me. Many of 
the interviews I conducted echoed those of Elliot Liebow. Certain words used by Sarah, Bernice 
and Shirley - the three homeless women Liebow interviewed - to describe their experience of 
homelessness came up almost verbatim in my conversations with refugees. In conclusion to this 
project, I leave the reader with the words of Fatema, a twenty four year old Syrian refugee whom 
I interviewed in Lebach: 
 “I didn’t lose only my home. In Syria I left my studies; the future I had started to build for 
myself; my parents; my friends; a community; traditions; and the feeling that other people ‘get 
me’ - that we have a shared history. […] During my journey through Greece, Macedonia, 
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Serbia, Hungary, Austria, and finally, Germany I felt like I was not human anymore, like I 
lost my dignity. I depended on each country to give me a form of identification paper, and even 
then, I was nothing else but an unwanted ‘refugee’. And that’s when I got paper work… Most 
countries I travelled through, I entered and left illegally. […] When I was in Hungary, the 
police closed the train station because of the chaos. There weren’t hundreds, but thousands of 
us. We protested and demanded that they reopen the station but they didn’t. It’s like we had 
created a mini revolution but it had no voice. They ended up reopening it days later, but only 
because they wanted to get rid of us. […] The refugee camp makes you inactive. You’re not 
needed. All you can do is wait. I felt lonely. […] I’ve made it to Germany and am being 
integrated but most Syrians are stuck in Syria or in camps around Syria. […] I don’t feel at 
home in Germany. But I feel safer. I’m grateful to be here but I feel isolated. It’s going to take 
a long time for me to feel like I’m not the ‘other’.” (Fatema) 
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